We consider the scenario where N utilities strategically bid for electricity in the day-ahead market and balance the mismatch between the committed supply and actual demand in the real-time market. Each utility aims at minimizing its own cost of per-unit electricity by optimizing the bidding strategy, with uncertainty in demand and local renewable generation taken into account. The per-unit electricity cost of a utility is a function of both the day-ahead clearing price and the real-time spot price affected by the market-level supply-demand mismatch. We model the interactions among utilities as a non-cooperative game and study the equilibrium strategies. We show that all utilities bidding according to (net load) prediction is a unique pure strategy Nash Equilibrium with two salient properties. First, it incurs no loss of efficiency; hence, the competition among utilities does not increase the social cost. Second, it is robust and (0, N − 1)-immune. Irrational fault behaviors of any subset of the utilities only help reduce the costs of other rational utilities. We prove the results hold for correlated prediction errors and a general class of real-time spot pricing models, which capture the relationship between the spot price, the day-ahead clearing price, and the marketlevel mismatch. Simulations based on real-world traces corroborate our theoretical results. Our study highlights that the market operator can design real-time pricing schemes according to the sufficient conditions derived in our paper, such that the day-ahead market admits a unique and efficient pure strategy Nash Equilibrium and it is robust to irrational fault behaviors.
. The deregulated electricity supply chain.
serve households and newly emerged active districts or microgrids. The market operator (known as independent system operator (ISO), e.g., ISO-NE [3] ) provides a trading place and matches the supply offers and demand bids at two different timescales and prices, i.e., one day ahead with day-ahead price and in real-time with spot price [4] , [5] .
• Day-Ahead Market: Generation companies (utilities) submit offers (bids) for selling (buying) electricity one day before the actual dispatch, based on generation (net load) forecasting. They are cleared at a market clearing price.
• Real-Time Market: Real-time market is designed to resolve the imbalance between the actual real-time demand and the committed supply purchased from the day-ahead market, on an hourly basis. We remark that the realtime electricity price depends on both the day-ahead clearing price as well as the real-time market level imbalance.
The cost of the utility is composed of the payment in day-ahead market and the expense in real-time market to settle the imbalance. NYISO reports that roughly 90% and 10% of electricity generation transactions are settled in the day-ahead market and the real-time market, respectively [6] .
Although existing electricity market is not a free market and is regulated to a certain degree, utilities can still act strategically to lower their overall procurement cost. In particular, in day-ahead market, utilities can overbuy (respectively underbuy) electricity given the load forecasting results, expecting they can sell the surplus in real-time market at a higher price (respectively buy the shortage at a lower price). We remark that utilities interact with each other in this process. The cost of a utility depends on not only its own bidding strategy, but also those of all other utilities since they affect the real-time market-level imbalance and hence the real-time spot price.
Our study focuses on understanding such interactions among strategic utilities on the demand side of the electricity supply chain; see a discussion on related works in Sec. I-B.
A. Contributions
We formulate the interactions among utilities as a non-cooperative game. Utility aim at minimizing individual costs by optimizing own bidding strategies in day-ahead market, taking into account uncertainty in load and local renewable generation. We seek answers to three fundamental questions:
• What is the optimal bidding strategy of the utility under the game theoretic setting? In particular, does there exist a pure strategy Nash Equilibrium 1 ? If so, is it unique?
• Does competition introduce efficiency loss compared with the social optimal under the coordinated setting?
That is, what is the loss of efficiency 2 at the equilibrium?
• How robust is the equilibrium against irrational fault behaviors 3 ? In particular, will rational utilities suffer in a fault-ridden setting with irrational utilities?
Answering these questions provides a deep understanding of the effectiveness of the electricity market design and operation and the impact of load uncertainty. We conduct a comprehensive study and make the following contributions.
To better bring out the insights and intuitions, we first focus on a baseline setting where the spot pricing model, which describes the relationship among the spot price, day-ahead clearing price, and real-time market-level mismatch, is linear, symmetric, and with a step jump at the origin [9] , [10] , and the load prediction errors across utilities are mutually independent.
• After formulating the utility game in Sec. II, in Sec. III-B, we show the strategy profile where all utilities bid according to (net load) prediction is a unique pure strategy Nash Equilibrium.
• In Sec. III-C, we show that the unique pure strategy Nash Equilibrium incurs no loss of efficiency. That is, the social cost of the equilibrium is the same as the optimal one under the coordinated setting. Furthermore, the equilibrium is robust and (0, N − 1)-immune. That is, irrational fault behaviors of any subset of the utilities only help reduce the costs of other rational utilities [8] .
We then generalize the results to the setting with general pricing models and correlated prediction errors.
• In Sec. IV, we present a set of sufficient conditions on spot pricing model for observing the unique, efficient, and (0, N − 1)-immune pure strategy Nash Equilibrium. In particular, we show that our above results hold for correlated prediction errors and a general class of real-time spot pricing models which can be nonlinear and continuous at the origin. In addition, we extend our results to the setting in which utilities submit bidding curves, which is the common practice in modern electricity market mechanism.
In Sec. V, we conduct extensive simulations based on price and load data from the ISO-NE electricity market.
The results corroborate our theoretical findings and highlight that it is possible to design effective real-time pricing 1 A pure strategy corresponds to that individual utility only places one quantity for one bid in the day-ahead market, which is the common practice. 2 The ratio between the social cost of the equilibrium and the social optimal quantifies the loss of efficiency due to competition [7] . 3 An equilibrium is ( ; K)-immune if non-fault utilities' expected costs do not increase by more than when at most any K other utilities deviate arbitrarily [8] .
schemes satisfying the sufficient conditions derived in our paper, such that the interactions among utilities admits a unique, efficient, and robust pure strategy Nash Equilibrium. Due to the space limitation, all proofs are presented in the appendix.
B. Related Work
While there have been a number of works studying the optimal bidding strategies of generation companies on the supply side of the electricity supply chain [11] - [14] , those on utilities' strategies on the demand side are most related to our study. They mainly focus on two aspects.
The first is on optimal bidding strategy of utilities. This includes characterizing the maximum profit for individual utility in the market [15] and optimal bidding strategy design [16] . The authors in [17] focus on the analysis of single-settlement market mechanisms. Optimization methods considering demand response are proposed in [18] - [20] . Bidding strategies based on time-series methods, data-driven predictions, and genetic algorithms are discussed in [21] , [22] .
The second is on the impact of load uncertainty. This includes modeling the real-time electricity imbalance and the impact of demand uncertainty [23] . It is observed that load uncertainty will affect utilities' cost and the electricity market equilibrium [15] , [24] , and renewable penetration is likely to deteriorate prediction errors and consequently the cost of utilities [23] , [25] - [27] .
Our work differs from the existing literature in that, we consider the two-settlement electricity market structure and we study the aggregate impact of all utilities' bidding strategies on the individual utility's cost with load uncertainty.
II. PROBLEM FORMULATION
Our goal in this paper is to understand the optimal and equilibrium bidding behaviors of the utilities in the day-ahead operation considering the two-settlement market structure. In particular, we model the market as a noncooperative game among N utilities in the same regional electricity market. Since the transactions are settled on an hourly base, without loss of generality, we focus on the settlements of electricity supply of a particular hour.
We use p d and p s (unit: $/MWh) to denote the corresponding day-ahead price and the spot price, respectively. In this paper, we make the following assumptions:
• The day-ahead price is cleared by ISO and is not affected by single utility's day-ahead procurement.
We assume a single utility does not have market power to manipulate market price. This assumption allows us to focus on a stylized model and better understand market operation.
• The utilities have distributional information on the actual net load through load forecasting.
The utilities estimate the real-time actual net load from the load forecasting result and the error distribution.
• The utilities only place one quantity bid in the day-ahead operation. The mismatch between the committed supply and the actual demand is balanced in real-time operation.
The third assumption can be generalized to the case in which utilities submit demand curves as bidding pairs (price, quantity); see the footnotes on page 5 for a discussion.
We introduce the strategic behavior of utility, the market pricing model, the evaluation of the strategy, and the market equilibrium in the following subsections.
A. Strategic Behavior of Utility and Load Mismatch Modeling
We define D i (unit: MWh) as the real-time actual net load of utility i at the particular hour, and it is only revealed to the utility in the real-time operation. At the time when utility i carries out bidding into the day-ahead market, it has a prediction of D i , denoted asD i , modeled as follows:
where i is a random variable representing the load prediction error. Recall that it is affected by both the uncertainties of demand and local renewable generation owned by the utilities and microgrids.
Given the load predictionD i , utility i can strategically participate in the day-ahead market by bidding a quantity
• µ i = 0: Utility bids precisely according to prediction in the day-ahead market operation.
• µ i > 0: Utility strategically underbuys in the day-ahead market operation.
• µ i < 0: Utility strategically overbuys in the day-ahead market operation.
We use µ i to represent the bidding strategy of utility i.
The bidding strategy of utility i will affect its mismatch between the real-time actual net load and the day-ahead purchased supply in the real-time market operation, which is denoted as ∆ i (unit: MWh). By definition, we have
Whenever there is an imbalance, i.e., ∆ i = 0, the utility has to settle this imbalance in the real-time market operation at the spot price p s , i.e., it either sells the residual electricity back to the market when ∆ i < 0, or buys the deficient electricity from the market when ∆ i > 0.
In addition, for ease of presentation, we define
as the market-level mismatch and the aggregate mismatch of all other utilities except utility i, respectively.
B. Real-time Market Spot Pricing Model
The real-time market electricity price generally depends on the total supply and demand imbalance, i.e, the difference between the day-ahead scheduled supply and the real-time actual demand. The displacement in the market imbalance consequently results in the spot price being inconsistent with the day-ahead price. More specifically, deficient supply in the market leads to a higher spot price, whereas excessive supply results in a lower spot price.
To capture their relationship, we consider the following linear pricing model 4 [10] (see Fig. 2 for illustration).
Here a 1 , a 2 , b 1 , b 2 ∈ R + are parameters of the pricing model. Remark: (i) The model was proposed in [10] by curve-fitting historical data. In general,
Specifically, [10] suggests a 1 = 0.0034, a 2 = 0.0005, b 1 = 1.2378, and b 2 = 0.6638.
(ii) The spot price function is discontinuous at ∆ = 0, i.e., b 1 > 1 > b 2 . This discontinuity is interpreted as a premium of readiness that utilities need to pay for the generation companies, since they have to generate urgent regulating power [9] . (iii) In this paper, we first focus on the linear symmetric pricing model, i.e., a 1 = a 2 > 0, (
which helps us extract insights from the theoretical results and provides a novel approach for market mechanism design. However, our results are not restricted to the model in (2) . In Sec. IV, we generalize our results to a larger class of pricing models, which can be nonlinear or continuous at the origin.
C. Cost Function of Utilities and Strategic Bidding Game
For utility i, its actual net load D i is settled in two timescales: (i) an amount of D i − ∆ i is settled in the day-ahead operation at price p d , and (ii) the remaining amount ∆ i is settled in the real-time operation at the spot price p s .
Hence the total electricity cost of utility i, denoted as C i , is given as follows (unit: $):
4 Generation imbalance from generation companies side also proposes an effect on the real-time market electricity price, e.g., in case of generator failure or the uncertainty from large-scale renewable generation. This generation imbalance may increase the variability of the market imbalance. This paper mainly focuses on the demand side of the electricity market and the effect of generation uncertainty on the market imbalance is not considered.
We further define the Average Buying Cost per unit electricity (ABC) for utility i as
Considering the net load uncertainty, the cost function for utility i is defined as the expected ABC i , i.e.,
Note that the cost of utility i not only depends on its own strategy µ i , but also depends on the strategies chosen by other utilities in the market through µ −i . The underlying reason is that the real-time spot price is determined by the market-level mismatch, thus other utilities' strategic behavior can affect the cost of utility i through the spot price p s .
Given the models of strategic behaviors and cost functions of the utilities, we model their interactions as a noncooperative game with N utilities where each utility aims to minimize its own cost C ost i (µ i , µ −i ) by choosing a strategy represented by µ i from the strategy set R. Formally, a strategy profile µ * = (µ * 1 , µ * 2 , ..., µ * N ) constitutes a Nash Equilibrium if for each i = 1, 2, ..., N , we have
where R is the set of real numbers.
III. MAIN RESULTS: MARKET EQUILIBRIUM ANALYSIS
This section considers a single utility's optimal strategic behavior from the cost minimization approach and the joint impact of utilities' strategies in the same regional electricity market. Under the two-settlement market mechanism, we study the Existence, Uniqueness, Efficiency, and Robustness of the equilibrium of the game among utilities. In this section, we make the following assumptions: Assumption 1. The real-time spot pricing model is linear symmetric, i.e., defined in (2) with
Assumption 2. The net load forecasting errors 1 , · · · , N are mutually independent.
These two assumptions allow us to better understand the impacts of utilities' strategies and the market equilibrium characteristics. Our results highlight that the symmetric pricing model provides a new approach for market mechanism design. We later extend the results to general pricing models and correlated prediction errors case in Sec. IV.
A. Load Imbalance Distribution Assumptions and Cost Analysis of Utilities' Strategic Behaviors
In our study, we further assume that the net load forecasting error i follows a general proper distribution defined below with zero mean and variance σ 2 i . Hence the load predictionD i is an unbiased estimate of actual load D i . Definition 1. The distribution of a random variable X is proper if its probability density function f X (·) is (i) Symmetric w.r.t. its mean ξ:
(ii) Central dominant:
Here ξ
Many prediction error distributions are proper, including Gaussian distribution and Laplace distribution. The specific meaning of central dominant comes from that utilities tend to make larger prediction errors with smaller probability compared with the case of smaller prediction errors with larger probability. Symmetric distribution implies that utilities have equal chances to encounter positive or negative prediction errors. Simulation results in Sec. V-B also verify these two conditions. Therefore, we pose the proper distribution assumption on net load forecasting errors. Considering utilities' bidding strategies µ i , the distribution of imbalance ∆ i follows a proper distribution with mean µ i and variance σ 2 i , i.e.,
Recall that individual utility's cost is affected by both its imbalance ∆ i and the aggregate of all others utilities' load imbalances ∆ −i . Under the independent prediction error assumption, the following lemma characterizes the distribution property of the sum of imbalances. 
then the probability density function of ∆ is also strictly central dominant.
The intuition behind Lemma 1 is similar to Lindeberg-Lévy Central Limit Theorem. From Lemma 1, we observe that the total imbalance also follows a proper distribution if individuals ones follow proper distributions. According to the independence assumption (Assumption 2), we have
2 ), and 
whereF (∆ i ) • When the day-ahead market clearing price
• When the slope of the real-time market pricing model increases, i.e., a 1 , a 2 increases, E[ABC i ] increases.
• When the discontinuous gap of the pricing model
In Sec. V-D, our simulation results verify these observations. The results show that utilities suffer higher costs under higher day-ahead clearing price and larger real-time market sensitivity, corresponding to larger p d and larger a 1 , a 2 , and b 1 − b 2 .
B. Existence and Uniqueness of the Nash Equilibrium
A Nash Equilibrium in the game among utilities in the market is a strategic profile in which all utilities choose the optimal strategy that minimizes its own cost given others' behaviors. We start by understanding the characteristics of the third term in (5).
Lemma 2. Under Assumption 3, given µ −i = 0, the optimal µ * i that minimize E ∆ i ·F (∆ i ) is 0, and it is strictly increasing w.r.t. |µ i |, the absolute value of µ i .
Lemma 2 shows that the third term in (5) that related to the discontinuous part of the spot pricing model will increase if the utility deviates from bidding according to prediction, given that the aggregation of all other utilities' strategies is zero.
Recall that utilities only place one quantity for one bid in the market, therefore, it is sufficient to focus on the pure strategy Nash Equilibrium to understand the outcome of the game. With Theorem 1 and Lemma 2, we present the following necessary condition for all pure strategy Nash Equilibria.
Theorem 2. Under Assumption 1, 2, and 3, a strategy profile µ * = (µ * 1 , µ * 2 , ..., µ * N ) constitutes a pure strategy Nash Equilibrium only if for all i = 1, 2, ..., N ,
Remarks: Theorem 2 says that if µ −i = 0, then the best response of utility i is to choose µ * i = 0. If µ −i = 0, then utility i s optimal strategy will always be opposite to this value.
The insights behind the Theorem 2 can be revealed from the perspective of cost minimization. We note that when the utility's real-time mismatch has the same sign with the market-level mismatch, the utility will suffer a loss; otherwise, it will gain. For example, when the market-level mismatch is positive, then the real-time price is higher than the day-ahead price according to the pricing model. If the utility's mismatch is negative, it means the utility buys excessive energy in the day-ahead market and it can sell it back to the market at a higher price. Thus the utility will gain. Recall that the utility's prediction error follows a proper distribution with mean zero, which indicates it has the same possibility to encounter particular positive or negative errors. Consequently, if the utility strategically overbuys (respectively underbuys) when participating in the day-ahead market, its real-time imbalance will tend to be negative (respectively positive).
With this in mind, let us look at the case when utility i chooses the bidding strategy µ i > 0, given µ −i = 0.
Since the market-level mismatch follows a proper distribution P(µ i , σ 2 ), when µ i > 0, the market-level mismatch and the utility i s mismatch tend to be positive simultaneously, thus the utility i tends to suffer a loss. Similarly, when µ i < 0, given µ −i = 0, the utility i will also suffer a loss.
Then we consider the cases when µ −i = 0. If µ −i > 0, the utility i will not choose µ i > 0 since this will make the market imbalance have more tendency to be positive. Similar result holds for the case when µ i < −µ −i .
These two situations expose the utility under the risk that its imbalance has more possibility to have the same sign with the market-level imbalance. Furthermore, choosing µ i to be less than 0 and greater than −µ −i will always be better than µ i = 0 and µ i = −µ −i . The optimal µ * i comes from the trade-off between the price and the amount. Similarly, when µ −i < 0, utility i will choose µ i ∈ (0, −µ −i ).
is a pure strategy Nash Equilibrium profile with m non-zero elements, where 1 ≤ m ≤ N . According to Theorem 2, for these m elements, denoted as (µ * 1 , µ * 2 , ..., µ * m ) without loss of generality, we define
It is straightforward to derive the following condition:
which describes the second and the third conditions in (6) for all non-zero µ i . Let M be the left hand side m × m matrix. We have the following results.
Theorem 3. Under Assumption 1, 2, and 3, the matrix M is a full rank matrix, and consequently µ * = (u * 1 , u * 2 · · · u * N ) = 0 is the unique pure strategy Nash Equilibrium.
Theorem 2 and 3 show that for any day-ahead clearing price 5 p d , if all utilities except utility i bid according to prediction, then bidding according to prediction is the best response of utility i as well (see Fig. 3 (a) for illustration). Consequently the strategy profile that all utilities bid according to (net load) prediction is the unique pure strategy Nash Equilibrium. Conventionally, Nash Equilibrium indicates that a utility does not benefit from deviating from the equilibrium, assuming other utilities keep their strategies unchanged. In Corollary 1, we show a stronger characteristic of the equilibrium. That is, the cost of the utility is strictly increasing w.r.t. the deviation distance between the strategy chosen and the equilibrium. In Sec. IV, we extend the results to general pricing models and correlated prediction errors (across utilities).
Corollary 1. Under Assumption 1, 2, and 3, given µ −i = 0, the optimal µ * i that minimize E[ABC i ] is 0, and
is strictly increasing w.r.t. |µ i |.
C. Efficiency and Robustness of the Nash Equilibrium
We have shown that The optimal social cost under the coordinated setting is obtained by solving the following weighted utilitarian social cost minimization problem:
where ABC total is defined as:
Here ∆ follows a proper distribution with mean µ = N i=1 µ i , and ABC total (unit: $/MWh) can be interpreted as the unit cost of the market to settle D total N i=1 D i amount of electricity. The following theorem shows that there is no loss of efficiency at the unique pure strategy Nash Equilibrium. Remarks: The intuition behind Theorem 4 lies in that we can treat the whole market as an entity. From the market-level perspective, an amount of (D total − ∆) power is committed at the price p d and the imbalance ∆ is settled at the spot market price p s . When the market has a particular positive (negative) real-time mismatch, this mismatch is settled at a price p s > p d (p s < p d ), respectively; hence the market will suffer a loss.
Since the market mismatch follows a proper distribution P(µ, σ 2 ), when µ > 0, the market-level mismatch tends to be positive, thus the market tends to suffer a loss facing a higher spot price. Similar analysis can be applied to the case when µ < 0. We conclude that the unique pure strategy Nash Equilibrium is efficient (see Fig. 3 (a) for illustration).
Furthermore, a socially optimal choice of strategies is also Pareto optimal by definition. That is, it is impossible to decrease one utility's cost without increasing others' costs. Theorem 4 also implies that the unique and efficient pure strategy Nash Equilibrium is Pareto optimal. We have a stronger observation on the structure of the equilibrium, and we define it as the Benevolent Pareto Optimality.
Theorem 5. Under Assumption 1, 2, and 3, consider all utilities except a group of utilities S, S ⊂ {1, 2, · · · , N }
is non-increasing w.r.t. |µ S |, where
, whose probability density function is strictly
Theorem 5 shows that the unique pure strategy Nash Equilibrium µ [8] . Recall that fault immunity means that even if some irrational utilities fault and deviate from the equilibrium arbitrarily, the costs of the non-faulty utilities are not affected by much. In particular, the Benevolent Pareto Optimal Equilibria are (0, N − 1)-immune, where N is the number of utilities. That is, irrational fault behaviors of any subset of the utilities do not increase the costs of other rational utilities (see Fig. 3 (b) for illustration). Details of fault tolerance and fault immunity can be found in [8] .
(a) Existence and Efficiency of the pure strategy Nash Equilibrium.
(b) Benevolent Pareto Optimality of the pure strategy Nash Equilibrium. Fig. 3 . Illustration of the pure strategy Nash equilibrium under linear symmetric pricing model and Gaussian distributed prediction errors. 13 
IV. MAIN RESULTS: EQUILIBRIUM GENERALIZATION
Previous analysis focuses on the scenario where the real-time market pricing model is linear symmetric, prediction errors of utilities are mutually independent, and utilities only place one quantity bid in the day ahead market. In this section, we relax these assumptions and extend our results.
A. Beyond the Linear Symmetric Spot Pricing Model
The uniqueness, efficiency, and robustness of pure strategy Nash Equilibrium hold for a large class of pricing models which can be nonlinear or continuous at the origin.
Theorem 6. Suppose Assumption 2 and 3 hold. Denote the pricing model as:
(10)
and p(∆) is continuous at ∆ = 0. The following statements hold:
(2) If p(·) is differentiable for all x ∈ R, and
.., µ * N ) = 0 is the unique pure strategy Nash Equilibrium. (3) E[ABC total ] is minimized at µ * = 0, and E[ABC total ] is non-increasing w.r.t. |µ|. Consequently, the pure strategy Nash Equilibrium µ
is differentiable for all x ∈ R, and either (11) is satisfied. In particular, pricing models satisfying (11) are convex when ∆ > 0 and concave when ∆ < 0.
The pricing models satisfying (12) or (13) are concave when ∆ > 0 and convex when ∆ < 0. (iv) The linear symmetric pricing model with discontinuous gap at the origin is the only one that satisfies both (11) and (12) .
Consequently, the equilibrium under the linear symmetric model is unique, efficient, Benevolent Pareto Optimal, and (0, N − 1)-immune. The above results show that if the real-time market scheme can be designed to meet the corresponding sufficient conditions, then the market will admit the desired equilibrium. (11) and k = 0.9 satisfying (12), where 1 {·} is the indicator function. To show the nonlinear relationship more clearly and let the price within the reasonable range, we vary ∆ from -0.1GWh to 0.1GW.
B. Beyond Independent Prediction Errors
In practice, load forecasting errors among utilities may be correlated; see e.g., [28] . In this subsection, we relax the independent prediction error assumption and consider the case that utilities' prediction errors ∆ i follow Gaussian distributions, and they are correlated with correlation coefficient ρ i,j
Cov (∆ i , ∆ j ) /σ i σ j ≥ 0. We obtain the following results.
Theorem 7. Suppose Assumption 1 holds, and for each i = 1, 2, ..., N , ∆ i follows a Gaussian distribution. In
.., µ * N ) = 0 is the unique and efficient pure strategy Nash Equilibrium with the Benevolent Pareto Optimal structure and is (0, N −1)-immune.
Theorem 7 states that with non-negative correlated Gaussian distribution prediction errors, the market still admits a unique and efficient pure strategy Nash Equilibrium with Benevolent Pareto optimal structure.
C. Beyond Submitting Quantity Bid
The current trend in power systems and deregulated electricity markets is that utilities are allowed to react to market prices since they may encounter short-term price fluctuation [29] , [30] . In this subsection, we extend our results to the setting in which utilities submit bidding pairs (price, quantity) which form the basis for the bidding curves for each hour.
Similar as the previous analysis, let D i ,D i , and Q i (p d ) be the actual net load, the net load prediction, and the bidding curve of utility i under different day-ahead market price p d respectively. Then utility i s bidding strategy and the aggregate strategies of all other utilities in the day-ahead market can be represented by
and
respectively. Since he day-ahead clearing price p d is not known to the utilities beforehand, when considering the randomization of p d , utilities report demand curves and aim to minimize the probability-weighted sum of
where f i (·) is a probability density function defined on R + , which represents utility i s estimation on the day-ahead price p d . Note that we assume utilities are market price-takers and therefore their individual strategies will not affect
Consequently, under the setting in which utilities submit bidding curves, a strategy profile µ
constitutes a Nash Equilibrium if for each i = 1, 2, ..., N , we have
where F is the set of all functions defined on R + . Based on above game theoretical formulation, we have the following results.
Theorem 8. Suppose Assumption 2 and 3 hold. Denote the non-decreasing symmetric pricing model as (10) and
The following statements hold:
(1) The strategy profile µ
is an efficient pure strategy Nash Equilibrium.
(2) If (11) holds, µ i (x) is piece -wise continuous on R + , and there does not exist a point
is the unique pure strategy Nash Equilibrium.
(3) If (12) or (13) holds, then the pure strategy Nash Equilibrium µ
Theorem 8 states that, the strategy profile that all utilities submit vertical 7 bidding curves exactly at the predicted demand is a robust pure strategy Nash Equilibrium which incurs no loss of efficiency. Furthermore, under mild continuity assumption 8 on µ i (x), the above efficient and robust equilibrium is unique.
We further extend the results to the scenario when utilities submit bidding curves with correlated load prediction error.
Theorem 9. Suppose Assumption 1 holds, and for each i = 1, 2, ..., N , i follows a Gaussian distribution. In
is an efficient pure strategy Nash Equilibrium with the Benevolent Pareto Optimal structure and is (0, N − 1)-immune. In addition, if µ i (x) is piece-wise continuous on R + , and there does not exist a point
, ∀i ∈ {i = 1, 2, ..., N }, then the equilibrium is unique.
Theorem 9 states that when utilities submit bidding curves and the prediction errors have non-negative correlated Gaussian distributions, all utilities submitting bidding curves at the predicted load is the unique, efficient pure strategy Nash Equilibrium with the Benevolent Pareto optimal structure.
V. SIMULATION RESULTS
In this section, we verify our assumptions on the distribution of prediction errors and study the long-term market equilibrium under various settings.
A. Simulation setting
We conduct simulations of the ISO-NE electricity market with 8 virtual utilities, each in charge of a state in New England region. Each utility participates in the wholesale electricity market in the two-time settlement manner. The realistic pricing model is obtained from [10] . We set a 1 = a 2 and (b 1 p d +b 2 p d )/2 = p d to guarantee the symmetricity condition of the linear symmetric spot pricing model. We study the market equilibrium under symmetric pricing 6 Under the setting of utilities submitting bidding curves, the corresponding Benevolent Pareto Optimal structure can be expressed as: consider all utilities except a group of utilities S, S ⊂ {1, 2, · · · , N } and
whose probability density function is strictly central dominant, then 7 We assume that the net load D i is inelastic and does not change with the day-ahead clearing price p d . In reality, utilities may have pricerelated flexible demands due to dynamic pricing [30] . Therefore, the net loads D i (p d ) may change with price p d . Our results still hold under such setting in which utilities submit bidding curves exactly at model and the impact of the asymmetricity of the realistic pricing model whose parameters are presented in Table. I. The consecutive hourly electricity net loads of the 8 utilities from January 1, 2011 to December 31, 2018 are obtained from ISO-NE market. The day-ahead price is obtained from the mean of the hourly day-ahead prices from ISO-NE market, which is 35$/MWh. We assume the day-ahead price is not affected by utilities' bidding strategies since about 90% of total electricity are transacted in the day-ahead market [6] . Utilities' costs during each time slot are calculated according to equation (3) . We use E[ABC i ] as the metric to evaluate utility i s bidding strategy. We focus on the utility in Maine state to carry out cost and equilibrium analysis. We observe similar results for other utilities. 
B. Prediction Error Distribution
Our theoretical analysis focuses on the scenario that the prediction errors of utilities follow proper distributions with zero mean. In this part, we verify our assumption on the symmetric distributed prediction errors.
In practice, utilities predict their demands based on historical loads, weather information, holiday/weekend information, etc. [28] . Multiple types of load prediction methods are applied in short-term demand forecasting (e.g.,
Artificial Neural Network (ANN) and Time Series Regression). In our study, we use ANN to forecast demands and the prediction errors are computed as the difference between the predicted values and the actual demands. We plot the load prediction error histogram of the utility in Maine state in Fig. 5 . Similar error histograms can be observed for other utilities.
In our simulation, the sample mean of the load prediction error is -0.068 ($/MWh), and the sample standard deviation is 38.7 ($/MWh). For testing the symmetric distribution around a specific center, we use Two-sample Kolmogorov-Smirnov test to conduct symmetry test on the load prediction error samples [31] , [32] . This test is used to test whether two underlying one-dimensional probability distributions differ. Notice that we assume the prediction error follows a proper distribution with the mean of zero. Let {X 1 , · · · , X n } be the observed values of the random variable . The result shows that the null hypothesis (i.e., "The sample data {X 1 , · · · , X n } and {−X 1 , · · · , −X n } are from the same continuous distribution") is not rejected at the 5% significance level. This observation verifies our symmetric distribution assumption on the load prediction error; that is, the load prediction error follows a symmetric distribution with mean of zero. The Central dominant condition can also be justified. As seen from the error histogram Fig. 5 , when the amplitude of the prediction error becomes larger, it has a smaller frequency of occurrence accordingly. We have similar observations for other utilities. Notice that here we do not assume the independence of prediction errors among utilities. In our simulation, it is shown that there are positive correlation coefficients in load prediction errors among utilities, as large as 0.66. In the following subsection, we find that our previous results still hold under this scenario, which shows the robustness of our analysis. 
C. Long-term Market Equilibrium and Efficiency Performance
Previously we have shown that bidding according to prediction is the best response of the utility given all other utilities bid at prediction. We now investigate the impact of the strategic behaviors of utilities on the long-term ABC (defined as the total cost divided by total net loads) and study the market equilibrium and efficiency. We obtained the long-term ABC i with respect to the bidding strategy µ i of the utility in Maine state by calculating the two-settlement average cost per hour in the consecutive 8 years, for different values of µ i . Similar relationships between costs and bidding strategies can also be observed for other utilities.
As seen in Fig. 10 , the utility's long-term cost takes the minimum when the utility bids according to prediction given all others are bidding according to prediction. Thus the strategy profile that all utilities bid according to prediction is a pure strategy Nash equilibrium under this setting. The above observation motivates utilities to bid at predicted net load in order to not only minimize their expected costs over a particular time slot but also minimize the long-term ABCs. Furthermore, we investigate the market-level long-term ABC total , which is computed as the aggregate cost over aggregate demand of all utilities. It is easy to justify that the market-level long-term
For a particularμ, we randomly decompose it such thatμ = N i=1μ i . The corresponding market-level long-term ABC total is computed as the average of long-term ABCs of different strategy profiles. Fig. 10 shows that this equilibrium incurs no loss of efficiency with respect to the market-level long-term ABC total . 
D. Market Size Analysis and Sensitivity of Real-time Market
The strategic potential of utilities arises from the dynamically changed real-time market electricity price. The sensitivity of the real-time market and the market size may propose impacts on utilities' costs. These two aspects of the real-time market can be regarded as the price changing characteristics with respect to the total imbalance, i.e, the slope and the discontinuous gap of the pricing model, and the number of participants N respectively. We want to study the impact of these three parameters. Toward this end, we equally separate each one of the 8 utilities into 2 to 5 sub-utilities as expanding the market size and calculate each new utility's ABC. Meanwhile, we vary the slope of the symmetric pricing model to be 0.005, 0.034 and 0.068, and we change (b 1 , b 2 ) to be (1, 1), (1.2378, 0.7622) and (1.8, 0.2), which are sufficient to illustrate the impacts of the real-time market sensitivity to imbalance. The corresponding utility's cost and market level cost are studied. The trend of cost change can be observed when the market size expands and the market sensitivity increases. We use a utility split from the original utility in Maine state as an example to show the cost change. Similar cost reduction trend holds for other utilities.
As seen, Fig. 6 and Fig. 7 reveal that both the utility's long-term cost and the market-level cost under the equilibrium decrease when N getting large. This characteristic implies that competition improves efficiency. Based on these observations, market designers have an economic incentive to allow competition and expand market access in order to lower both utilities' costs and the market-level cost.
Meanwhile, Fig. 8 depicts that when the slope of the linear symmetric spot pricing model becomes larger, i.e., larger a 1 and a 2 , the utility suffers a larger cost given the same deviation quantity µ i . The market-level long-term ABC total presents a similar cost-strategy relationship, which is depicted in Fig. 9 .
In addition, Fig. 12 and Fig. 13 show that when the premium of readiness increases, i.e., larger b 1 − b 2 , both utilities and the market observe larger long-term costs under the same deviation quantity µ i and µ.
We also study the impacts of day-ahead clearing price p d . Fig. 14 and Fig. 15 show that when the day-ahead clearing price p d increases, both utilities and the market have lager long-term ABCs. Since the costs of utilities are proportional to p d , we observe that there exist linear relationships between ABC and µ i , and between ABC total and µ.
These observations correspond to the previous theoretical results in Theorem 1. The above study suggests that improving the level of competition and the resilience of the spot pricing against the market-level mismatch can not only benefits utilities but also reduce the social cost. Fig. 12 . Impact of the premium of readiness on utility's cost. Fig. 13 . Impact of the premium of readiness on market-level cost. 
E. Performance under Realistic Pricing Model
We now study the impacts of the asymmetry of the realistic pricing model on the market equilibrium and the utility's cost. The pricing model parameters are listed in Table. I. We present the cost to strategy curve of the utility in Maine state. We observe similar cost to strategy relationships for other utilities.
As seen, Fig. 11 shows that when all other utilities bid according to prediction, the utility has an incentive to deviate from bidding according to prediction, which implies that the strategy profile that all utilities bid according to prediction is no longer a Nash Equilibrium. Under the realistic pricing model, a utility can reduce its cost by bidding higher than the predicted net load. This can be explained intuitively as follows: when the real-time market performs less sensitive to the negative imbalance, i.e., a 1 > a 2 , utilities can overbuy in the day-ahead market to sell the surplus at a higher price compared with the symmetric pricing model case that we choose.
From the cost to strategy curve, the optimal non-zero bidding strategy for the utility is to choose µ * i = −68.5(MWh). Under this case, the utility only witnesses a 0.84% cost reduction compared with choosing µ i = 0, which indicates that under the realistic pricing model, the utility does not have much incentive to deviate from bidding according to prediction given all other utilities bid according to prediction.
VI. CONCLUSION
In this paper, we study the strategic behaviors of utilities under a non-cooperative game theoretical setting in the day-ahead market considering the two-settlement structure of the deregulated wholesale electricity market and the uncertainty in demand and local renewable generation. We show that, for the case with general spot pricing models and correlated prediction errors (across utilities), all utilities bidding according to prediction is the unique, efficient, and robust pure strategy Nash Equilibrium, which incurs no loss of efficiency and is (0, N − 1)-immune to irrational fault behaviors. In addition, our study suggests that market designers may improve the level of competition and the resilience of the spot pricing against the market-level mismatch to reduce utilities' costs and the social cost. Our study provides new insights for market mechanism design in that the market operator can design real-time pricing schemes according to the sufficient conditions derived in our paper, such that the interactions among utilities admit a unique and efficient pure strategy Nash Equilibrium and it is robust to irrational fault behaviors.
APPENDIX

A. Proof of Lemma 1
Proof: Without loss of generality, we may first assume that ∆ 1 and ∆ 2 both have zero mean values. Then for ∆ ∆ 1 + ∆ 2 , we have:
Notice that f ∆ (z) is an even function. Next, we need to prove that:
Let us consider two points z1+z2 2 + x and z1+z2 2 − x. Due to the symmetry of h(x), we have:
Hence we conclude that
In addition, if there exist one ∆ i , i ∈ {12, · · · , N }, which satisfies the strictly central dominant condition:
∆ i also satisfies the strictly central dominant condition. Let us compute
Without loss of generality, we assume ∆ 2 satisfies the strictly central dominant condition. Then f ∆ (z 1 )−f ∆ (0) < 0 since there exist some x > 0 such that f ∆1 (
. Similarly, let us compute
. This complete the proof.
Based on above observation, we see that if all utilities satisfy proper distribution condition, and all other utilities decide to bidding truthfully, then ∆ −i follows proper distribution with mean value of 0.
B. Proof of Theorem 1
Proof: According to pricing model, given the day-ahead market price p d , the spot price p s is a linear step function of ∆. Namely,
where 1 {·} is indicator function, and
Then we can compute the expectation of ABC i in the following way:
It remains to compute E[p s · ∆ i ]:
So the E[p s · ∆ i ] can be divided into three terms. In the following, we will compute these three terms one by one.
It is easy to verify that when the price model is symmetric and all other utilities decide to bid truthfully, then:
where in the last equality, the expectation is taken with respect to ∆ i . Further, we have
whereF
To sum it up, when the pricing model is symmetric, i.e., a 1 = a 2 , b 1 + b 2 = 2, then given µ i = 0, The expectation of ABC i is given as:
WhereF is defined as above and E[ABC i ] takes the minimal value when µ i = 0. Then this complete the proof.
C. Proof of Lemma 2
Proof: Notice that the aboveF (·) is an odd function when µ −i = 0. Let us define
Hence it is sufficient to consider the case of µ i > 0. Let us compute
Let
Since f ∆i satisfy the proper distribution conditions, it is easy to see that
To see this, consider the following two cases: when δ i ≥ µ i , we have 0
The last strictly > is got since g 3 (δ i ) > 0 for some δ i .
This proves the Lemma 2.
D. Proof of Theorem 2
Proof: When the pricing model is symmetric, we have
Let us use ∆f (
The above equality holds since ∆f (
and it is easy to verify that the upper formula is no less than zero. Hence we have:
Consider two symmetric points
Next, we want to show that the above U (µ i ) function is left continuous at µ i = 0 and right continuous at
What we need to prove is that:
It is easy to see that
As to the second term, when µ i → 0 − , we have
Then we have:
Finally we have
This proves that the cost function is left continuous at µ i = 0.
ii) Right continuous at
As to the second term, when µ i → −µ
, then we derive:
This proves that the cost function is right continuous at µ i = −µ −i .
Next, we want to show that the minimal value of the above cost function for utility i can only be attained with 0) , without causing confusion, we will use a i to denote a i (µ i , µ −i ).
It is clear when µ i decrease a little bit from 0, the cost function value will also decrease. In other words, the left derivative of E[ABC i ] is positive at µ i = 0.
. It is clear when µ i decrease a little bit from 0, the cost function value will also decrease. In other words, the right derivative of E[ABC i ] is negative at µ i = −µ −i .
From the above analysis, we see that given µ −i > 0, the optimal strategy of utility i that minimize E[ABC i ],
. Similar analysis can be constructed when µ −i < 0 and the optimal strategy of utility i that minimize
This complete the proof of Theorem 2.
E. Proof of Theorem 3
Proof: Previous we have shown that {u * 1 , u * 2 · · · u * N } where u * i = 0 for ∀i is a pure strategy Nash Equilibrium. Assume there exist another strategy profile {ũ 1 ,ũ 2 · · ·ũ N } where there exist at least oneũ i = 0. From the best response perspective of Nash Equilibrium, it is natural to derive the following condition of the NE strategy profile:
If we want to show that {u * 1 , u * 2 · · · u * N } where u * i = 0 for ∀i is the unique Nash Equilibrium, it is equivalent to show that there do not exist another strategy profile {ũ 1 ,ũ 2 · · ·ũ N } where there exist at least oneũ i = 0. Assume we have a such strategy profile with total m elements to be non-zero, and use {ũ 1 · · ·ũ j · · ·ũ m } to denote. Where 1 ≤ m ≤ N then the equivalent condition turns to be:
To proceed, we have the following proposition:
Proposition 1. The matrix M with the below form is of full rank, where
Proof: Consider the determinant of the matrix.
Applying the property in Schur complement, let
where
Hence it is easy to see that det(M ) > 0. Then matrix M is of full rank.
The above observation shows that there do not exist such a profile with non-zero entries but satisfy the equilibrium condition.
This prove the uniqueness of the pure strategy Nash Equilibrium in the case as stated in Theorem 3.
F. Proof of Theorem 4
Proof: It is easy to compute
Previous from Lemma 1 we have shown that the total mismatch is symmetric distributed and centralized at µ = N i=1 µ i . Let f µ ∆ be the probability density function of ∆, then: when a 1 = a 2 , we have
Secondly, let us compute
It is easy to see that U (µ) = U (−µ), hence it is sufficient to consider the case of µ > 0.
where the last inequality comes from f
From the above proof we see that as long as the mean value of total imbalance µ = N i=1 µ i = 0, this shows that the unique Nash Equilibrium strategy profile {u * 1 , u * 2 · · · u * N } where u * i = 0 for ∀i ∈ {1, 2 · · · N } is efficient from the social cost minimization perspective. In addition, the more the imbalance deviates from 0, the more inefficient the market is.
G. Proof of Theorem 6
Proof: It is easy to verify that when the price model is symmetric and the utility j decides to bid truthfully, then:
WhereF −
Let us define
Hence it is sufficient to consider the case of µ −j > 0. Let us compute
Since δ * j f ∆j (δ * j ) ≥ 0 and f 0 ∆−j (δ −j ) satisfy the proper distribution conditions. We have
Then we have
To sum up, when the pricing model is symmetric, i.e., a 1 = a 2 , b 1 + b 2 = 2, then given µ j = 0, The expectation of ABC j is given as:
whereF is defined as above and E[ABC j ] takes the maximal value when µ −j = 0. Meanwhile, if strictly central dominant condition is satisfied for either ∆ −j or ∆ j , it is easy to prove the decreasing part. This completes the proof.
H. Proof of Theorem 6 (1)
So the E[p s · ∆ i ] can be divided into two terms. In the following, we will compute these two terms one by one.
has the same expression as linear price model case.
It remains to compute
Consider
Then consider µi 2 + δ i and
Further more, considering µ 1 > µ 2 > 0 (
This complete the the proof of Theorem 6 (1).
I. Proof of Theorem 6 (2)
Proof: Without loss of generality, assume
The last inequality comes form that the pricing function is increasing. Further more, considering
following similar approach, we can prove that
The above observation reveals that the utility will not choose to bid at µ i > 0 and µ i < −µ −i .
Then let us consider the left derivative at µ i = 0 − and right derivative at
For the second term, we can prove that
For the first term,
Consider two symmetric points −µ −i + and −µ −i − , where ≥ 0. The inner integral part is
It is easy to prove that this term is non-negative. Hence when
We have
It is easy to prove that
For the first term, we can prove that
For the second term,
This complete the first part of Theorem 6 (2).
J. Proof of Theorem 6 (3)
So the E[p s · ∆] can be divided into two terms. In the following, we will compute these two terms one by one.
It remains to compute
Further more, considering µ 1 > µ 2 > 0
This complete the proof.
K. Proof of Theorem 6 (4)
Proof: As to the Pareto optimal part, we define
Then consider
The last '<' holds if the strictly inequality in derivative of the pricing function exists. The decreasing part can be proved by similar approach without requiring the strictly central dominant condition to be satisfied. This complete the proof of Theorem 6 (4).
L. Proof of Theorem 7
Previous analysis focuses on the scenario that the load forecasting error of utilities are mutually independent, in this section, we relax this assumption to consider more general case, i.e., the load forecasting error of utilities are correlated. More specifically, we assume the load forecasting error of utility i, denoted as ∆ i , follows Gaussian distribution with mean µ i and variance σ 2 i and they are jointly normal. For simplicity, we assume that the correlation between ∆ i and ∆ j are ρ ij for any i and j and the covariance matrix of random vector
For simplicity, let us consider ρ ij ≥ 0, ∀i, j, i.e., we assume there are positive correlation among utilities.
Under these assumptions, we define ∆ −i = N j,j =i ∆ j and have
where µ −i = j =i µ j and σ
follows bivariate normal distribution and their joint PDF is
where ρ i is the correlation between ∆ i and ∆ −i and it can be expressed as
The following theorem characters the expected ABCs of utilities.
Theorem 10. When the pricing model is symmetric, i.e., a 1 = a 2 , b 1 + b 2 = 2, the expected ABC of utility i can be expressed as:
Proof: We know that
where E[p s · ∆ i ] can be expressed as:
It then remains to compute 
Secondly, let us compute E[ξ 2 ∆ i ] :
Lastly, let us compute
Then plug in Eqs. (81) and (82), we can get the final result.
What we need to prove is that, given µ −i = 0, the optimal µ * i that minimize E[ABC i ] is 0, and E[ABC i ] is strictly increasing w.r.t. |µ i | Proof: Given µ −i = 0, the expected ABC of utility i can be simplified as:
To prove that E[ABC i ] obtains its minimum when µ i = 0, we rewrite it as
It is straightforward to verify that argmin µi g 1 (µ i ) = 0 and it is increasing w.r.t.|µ i |. So it remains to show that argmin µi g 2 (µ i ) = 0 and it is increasing w.r.t |µ i |. Since b 1 > b 2 , it is equivalent to show
)]. It remains to prove that argmin µi U (µ i ) = 0.
Firstly, we note that U (µ i ) is an even function. To see this, consider the following equations:
Then it remains to prove that ∀µ > 0,
where X µ ∼ N (µ, σ where the last inequality follows from the fact that erf (x) is increasing in x and erf (ky) − erf (k(y − µ y )) ≥ 0.
In addition, we have when |µ| increases, µ 0 E[erf (kY )] increases. Then we prove that for any µ > 0,
Thus argmin µi U (µ i ) = 0.We also have larger |µ| is, larger the difference.
The efficiency part is the same as the independent case.
As to the Pareto optimal part, we have: given µ i = 0, the optimal µ * −i that maximize E[ABC i ] is 0.
Proof: When a 1 = a 2 , b 1 + b 2 = 2, given µ i = 0, the expectation of ABC i can be expressed as
We prove that E[ABC i ] attains its maximum at µ −i = 0. Note that 
When µ −i = 0, we can get that Further, we note that
thus it is straightforward to verify that 
For the first term
For the second term
It is easy to prove that when µ i = 0, We can calculate the derivative with respect to µ i as
